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“To hell with the Constitution!”1  
How Theodore Roosevelt Acting Abroad Undermined 
Progressive Reforms at Home 
 
Liam Byrnes 
Theodore Roosevelt is remembered fondly as one of the 
greatest American presidents. He stepped into office as the 
youngest president in American history in the first year of a new 
century. Exuding youth and ingenuity, he brought hope to the 
American people. Extremely opinionated, bombastic, and fixated 
on ideals, Roosevelt garnered America’s attention, becoming the 
“first president to be treated as a media personality,” although such 
is all too familiar today.2 The power residing in the Oval Office 
had been mostly silent in the previous half century and Roosevelt’s 
youth and character brought new energy and grandeur to the office. 
In Roosevelt, the United States had not only a President, but a 
celebrity.  
The aftermath of the Gilded Age gave necessary rise to the 
Progressive Era, in which historians revere Roosevelt as a 
champion. Progressive politics demanded new instruments like 
commissions and regulations to protect people from the unbridled 
industry of the modern age. Roosevelt wielded these Progressive 
instruments as extensions of his office, adding unprecedented 
powers to the executive branch. These powers would not be 
limited to domestic politics, as the United States emerged as a new 
global industrial force with untested international power and 
influence. Theodore Roosevelt’s unbridled popularity allowed him 
to revolutionize the American presidency and significantly pursue 
an international agenda in direct conflict with contemporary 
American Progressivism. Americans today, as those in the past, 
ignore such contradictions at their own peril.  
                                                          
1 Edmund Morris, Theodore Roosevelt: President (CT: University of Hartford Press, 
1981), 14.  
2 William E. Leuchtenburg, The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill 
Clinton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 30.  
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A celebrity in his ‘bully pulpit’, Roosevelt led an 
internationally immature and tentative nation into an unstable 
global arena in pursuit of adventure. To turn his words against him, 
one cannot “by insisting on the impossible, put off the day when 
the possible can be accomplished.”3 Roosevelt chased an 
impossible world peace while neglecting domestic social issues 
that, with his attention, might have been solved. In neglecting 
necessary domestic progressive reforms he put off a higher quality 
of life for the common Americans as well as the pursuit of civic 
peace, a goal to which he ironically referred as “our bounden 
duty.”4  
Such policy would lead Senator Bob La Follette (R-WI) to 
stipulate at the looming of the first World War, “under a pretext of 
carrying democracy to the rest of the world, we have done more to 
undermine and destroy democracy in the United States than it will 
be possible for us as a Nation to repair in a generation of time.”5 
Yet, new power, immense popularity, and a Republican dominated 
Congress gave Roosevelt free rein over the nation’s new position 
of growing international influence. As he expanded executive 
power, he ignored Congress. The United States had been acting 
gingerly abroad for nearly a decade when Roosevelt set a new 
course: his own. In that previous decade, Grover Cleveland, with 
Congressional approval, had strengthened American coastlines but 
yielded when Congress pulled the reins.6 William McKinley 
timidly exercised the Monroe Doctrine in “splendid little wars” 
that met opposition.7 A structured international system seemed to 
be on the horizon but juvenile America knew it was not yet ready.  
                                                          
3 “The Afternoon Session: Mayor, Gov. Hughes, Secretary Root, and Mr. Carnegie 
Speak,” The New York Times (1857-1922), April 16, 1907. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Nancy Unger, Fighting Bob La Follette: The Righteous Reformer (Wisconsin Historical 
Society Press, 2008), 252-253.   
6 “Taft Finds Precedent, Cites Cleveland Policy,” New York Times (1857-1922), 30 Oct. 
1904.  
7 Robert A. Hart, The Great White Fleet: It’s Voyage Around the World, 1907-1909 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), 24. 
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In 1896, Lord Salisbury mildly ventured, “a system of 
arbitration is an entirely novel arrangement… it would be wise to 
commence with a modest beginning, and not to hazard the success 
of the principle by adventuring it upon doubtful ground.”8 Even a 
modest beginning proved to be too much. Despite support from 
Cleveland and McKinley, Congress rejected the Anglo-American 
Arbitration Treaty put forward in 1897 that would bring the United 
States into European affairs. Executives and their administrations 
pushed but “opinion was not yet ready at that time to go as far as 
Secretary Olney was anxious to go,” and opposition held, for the 
time. 9  
The only opinions forty-two-year-old Roosevelt cared for 
were those holding him in high regard. Roosevelt’s charisma and 
immense popularity put him above much criticism. He truly was a 
celebrity. That status, combined with bombastic confidence, led 
him to venture well onto doubtful ground and “brush aside the 
isolationist tradition” that his predecessors had respected. 10  
As an accidental president following the assassination of 
President McKinley, Roosevelt started slowly in his ventures and, 
originally, kept at least one eye on public opinion. One year into 
his presidency, Roosevelt was asked to arbitrate the Venezuela 
Crisis.11 The public responded vehemently within days: Senator 
Shelby Moore Cullom (R-IL), Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, brought to Congress “a large number of 
telegrams” in “emphatic protest” of arbitration.12 According to The 
New York Times, the opposition was “based mainly on the 
apprehension that some contingency might arise which would 
seriously involve the United States in the case the President should 
become arbiter.”13 Though Roosevelt desired involvement in the 
                                                          
8 Alfred L.P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906 (New York: E.P. 
Dutton and Company, 1969), 473.  
9 Ibid., 475.  
10 Hart, The Great White Fleet, 7.  
11 "President Roosevelt Asked to Arbitrate," New York Times (1857-1922), 21 Dec. 1902.  
12 “President Urged Not to Arbitrate,” New York Times (1857-1922), 24 Dec. 1902.  
13 Ibid. 
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affair, public opinion maintained overriding influence on the forty-
two year old Bull Moose. Isolationism held as tradition for a bit 
longer.  
Imperialist debates were not merely of political concern, but 
were widespread in elite social circles, popular newspapers, and 
the common people’s church. As overseas economic opportunity 
tempted big business, the debate was riddled with questions 
concerning morality and the undermining of American values. 
Both sides argued that international action either promoted or 
denounced American ideologies. Imperialists asserted that 
involvement was necessary for the good of humanity. In the words 
of Roosevelt, “No triumph in peace is quite so great as the supreme 
triumph of war.” Anti-Imperialists, however, denounced the “the 
bleeding ulcer in the Philippines” to which the United States had 
contributed.14 Mark Twain declared that Philippine intervention 
had “stained the flag” while William Jennings Bryan “would not 
exchange the glory of this Republic for the glory of all the 
empires.” 15 
TR’s popularity grew as he settled into the presidency. 
Americans held him in high esteem for a multitude of reasons: he 
claimed to be a northern, a southerner, a westerner, and proudly an 
American. He was a statesman, a gentleman, and a frontiersman, 
“like Paul Bunyan, a folk hero, the quintessential American.”16 TR 
possessed the public trust and respect in unrivaled fashion (image 
A). Proud and aggressive, he exuded demi-god status in every 
situation — domestic and international — and he absolutely loved 
being the center of attention.  
Roosevelt was elected in his own right in 1904 with the 
greatest popular vote in American history.17 Believing the victory 
spoke for itself, Roosevelt no longer yielded to Congress (image 
                                                          
14 Russel Crandall, “Staining the Flag,” Survival, Volume 60, Issue 6, 193.  
15 Ibid., 195; William Jennings Bryan, “Imperialism,” Indianapolis, Indiana, 8 Aug. 1900.  
16Kathleen Dalton, “Why America Loved Teddy Roosevelt,” The Psychohistory Review, 
vol. 8 no. 3, 269.  
17 Dalton, “Why America Loved Teddy Roosevelt,” 280.  
4
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 24 [2019], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol24/iss1/7
20 
B). Future endeavors occurred without Congressional consultation 
or approval. Roosevelt acted and Congress followed, or so he 
thought. Swept up in Roosevelt’s grandeur and hope for American 
prominence on the international stage the people looked on in awe. 
Like their president, they ignored Progressive failures affecting 
daily domestic life. As Samuel J. Tilden put it, Roosevelt promised 
“a situation to vindicate our reputation and interests,” eclipsing the 
true Progressive movements.18 Though Roosevelt revered the 
“strenuous life” he turned away from the most difficult domestic 
challenges and sought international adventure wherein he 
abandoned Progressive values of democracy and liberty.  
Armed with four more years and national celebrity status, the 
confident TR set out, beginning with the Panama Affair. In seeking 
an Isthmian canal for the benefit of American trade and naval 
movement, TR undermined the Colombian sovereignty that the 
United States had promised to uphold in the Bidlack Treaty of 
1846. Without consulting Congress, Roosevelt ordered the United 
States Navy to prevent Colombian forces from landing troops to 
quash the rebellion. This rebellion, aided by Roosevelt, established 
the independent nation of Panama. Without consulting Congress, 
Roosevelt immediately recognized Panama as a sovereign nation. 
In return, Panama gave the United States full control over the 
construction of the Isthmian Canal.19 The Monroe Doctrine was 
intended as an instrument of protection for South American 
neighbors from European manipulation. Yet as soon as policy 
removed European influence, Roosevelt’s America stepped in to 
fill the void. Progressivism intended to celebrate democracy for all, 
yet Roosevelt applied this maxim only to “civilized nations of the 
world.” 20  In South America, the United States did as he pleased 
(image D).  
                                                          
18 “Taft Finds Precedent, Cites Cleveland Policy.” 
19 “Scores Roosevelt: D.B. Hill Tales the Panama Deal as his Text: Executive Acts 
Lawless” The Washington Post (1877-1922), 5 Oct. 1904.; Image C.  
20 “Afternoon Session.” 
5
Byrnes: To hell with the Constitution
Published by Scholar Commons, 2019
21 
Roosevelt asserted that the United States “scrupulously 
respected the rights of all other peoples” acting “in a spirit of 
genuine disinterestedness, of genuine and single minded 
purpose.”21 Senator David B. Hill (D-NY), however, cited the 
“lawlessness… displayed in the Panama Affair” in which 
Roosevelt “did violate plain treaty obligations, plain international 
usages, and the Constitution of the United States.”22 The Monroe 
Doctrine and Roosevelt’s Big Stick Diplomacy simply put a new 
face on the bully of “uncivilized nations” (image E). Charged with 
taking “Panama without consulting the Cabinet”, Roosevelt later 
attempted to explain his actions to his cabinet members.23 When he 
asked if he had defended himself, Secretary of War Elihu Root 
responded, “You certainly have. You have shown that you were 
accused of seduction and you have conclusively proved that you 
were guilty of rape.”24 
The United States desired an Isthmian canal but wanted it 
attained in a democratic fashion, not as the product of a breached 
treaty and an aided revolution that setting precedents for, in 
Congress’ mind, unconstitutional, undemocratic intervention. 
Desire for the Canal came mostly from big businesses that sought 
access to global markets for their surplus goods. Economic 
motivation is a legitimate reason for naval bases and trade 
protection but can’t justify the great increase in battle cruisers 
amidst a lack of growth among the merchant marines, which exists 
solely to protect American commerce.25 There is undeniable 
correlation between these Naval expenditures and Roosevelt’s 
status as former Secretary of the Navy.  Naval expenditures rose 
from $22 million to $139 million in twenty-four years while 
                                                          
21 “Scores Roosevelt.” 
22 Ibid. 
23 Paul Kennedy, “The United States as New Kid on the Block,” The Rise and Fall of 
Great Powers (Random House, Inc., 1988), 246. 
24 Morris, Theodore Roosevelt, 15.  
25 Kennedy, “The United States as New Kid on the Block, 1890-1940,” 245. 
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domestic Progressivism struggled for funding and support (image 
F). 
This growing naval strength led Indiana Republican Senator 
Beveridge to pronounce, “We will not abandon our opportunity in 
the Orient” where limitless markets lay. America would do so by 
declaring “the Philippines are ours forever.”26 He justified his 
blatant rejection of constitutional values on the basis that the 
Filipinos “are not of a self-governing race” and that white 
westerners were by God’s decree “master organizers of the 
world.”27 Roosevelt shared a similar sentiment. Senator Bob La 
Follette, however, regarded the affair disdainfully with steadfast 
progressive concern: “If the Lord would only let us out of the 
Filipino mess… we might in the course of time pay off the own to 
the black man.”28  
Debate and question spread beyond the political arena. Even 
at the height of Roosevelt’s popularity The New York Times 
questioned if international intervention was “dangerous to our 
peace and safety?”29 Americans feared the possible implications 
and affects that lay ahead should this kind of intervention continue. 
Senator Hill called the “…executive precedents begun by him 
[Roosevelt] most inconvenient and damaging to our future 
democracy.”30 The international arena was unstable as European 
imperialism, and the strife that went with it, spanned the globe. 
Anti-Imperialists viewed intervention as ‘unnecessary as it is 
unjust.”31 New England minister Reverend Charles Ames brought 
imperialist fears to his congregation: “The policy of imperialism 
threatens to change the temper of our own people, and to put us 
into a permanent attitude of arrogance, testiness, and defiance 
towards other nations ... Once we enter the field of international 
                                                          
26 Albert Beveridge, “On the War in the Philippines,” US Senate, Washington DC, 9 Jan. 
1900.   
27 Ibid.  
28 Unger, Fighting Bob La Follette, 239.  
29 “A Perplexing Protectorate,” New York Times (1857-1922), 28 Dec. 1905. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Crandall, “Staining the Flag,” 193.  
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conflict as a great military and naval power, we shall be one more 
bully among bullies. We shall only add one more to the list of 
oppressors of mankind.”32 Such fears found manifestation in the 
likes of Senator Beveridge.  
Roosevelt crusaded on, ignoring Congress and parading the 
Colombian affair as a victory. “In Panama we are successfully 
performing what is to be the greatest engineering feat of the ages, 
and while we are assuming the whole burden of the work, we have 
explicitly pledged ourselves that the use is to be free for all 
mankind.”33 Here Roosevelt begins to ascend his “bully pulpit” to 
a new level. With a self-aware celebrity status, he knew that, 
despite some public criticism, he had the nation’s ear and used it to 
its full extent.  
Though he could manipulate the masses with his rhetoric, 
Congress and prominent Anti-Imperialists continued to raise their 
voices.  They expressed not just disdain or disagreement but real 
fear of Roosevelt’s trajectory and where it would ultimately lead. 
“Are we ready to undertake the task of enforcing good behavior on 
our Latin neighbors to the south in order to guarantee ourselves 
against undesirable complications with European Powers?” asked 
The New York Times34 Beyond the Panama Affair, international 
action meant interaction with European nations that held great 
economic and military power, yet were greatly inconsistent, 
hubristic, and reluctant to share power. Roosevelt eagerly stepped 
onto this stage where lofty ideals were only sporadically applied.35  
Public sentiment noted that Roosevelt acted alone and 
beyond the limits honored by previous presidents. The nation’s 
founding instilled a wariness of unfettered executive power. TR 
was setting a new precedent. Put simply, Roosevelt’s character in 
the White House worried some, and his growing “follow-the-
                                                          
32 Ibid., 192. 
33 “Afternoon Session.” 
34 “A Perplexing Protectorate.” 
35 The Niagara Conference led by WEB Du Bois meanwhile fought for the basic rights of 
African Americans. 
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leader” attitude didn’t quell those worries. Again, it wasn’t only 
inside politicians who expressed such concerns. In the first year of 
his elected term The New York Times urged, “We very much doubt 
whether the Senate is now prepared to follow the President so far 
as perhaps he would be ready to go. Mr. McKinley, we think, 
would have been at pains to make sure that the Senate would 
accept and support any policy he might have formulated in the 
pursuance of such a design. If the Senate would not have followed, 
he himself would have come to a halt. Not so Mr. Roosevelt. He 
has made the venture alone.”36 Roosevelt took no time to consult 
or to debate, ignoring the basic tenets of democracy that the 
Progressive movement aimed to perfect. According to the British 
statesmen Lord Morely, Roosevelt “‘was America”, yet it was 
Progressive values that were truly American, values that took the 
Constitution to heart and sought a “more perfect union,” not an 
empire.37 
Roosevelt was indifferent to such concerns, stating defiantly: 
“I took the canal zone and let Congress debate, and while the 
debate goes on the canal does also.”38 His tactic proved successful 
in Panama, but Congress would soon use its check to reign in 
Roosevelt. In the first months of 1905 Congress stood firmly 
against the president. Secretary of State John Hay introduced a 
debt plan for Santo Domingo that the “Senate saw only as a gross 
violation of the Constitution, an egregious abuse of executive 
authority.”39 Along with the debt proposal, Roosevelt presented 
various European arbitration treaties. These treaties were so 
amended by the Senate that Secretary Hay withdrew them from 
debate on behalf of Roosevelt, forcing Roosevelt to admit that the 
United States was unwilling to enter into European treaties.40  
                                                          
36 “A Perplexing Protectorate.” 
37 Morris, Theodore Roosevelt, 15.  
38 Theodore Roosevelt, The New York Times, March 25, 1911.  
39 John Taliaferro, All the Great Prizes: The Life of John Hay, from Lincoln to Roosevelt 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 529.; Image G. 
40 Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, 480.  
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It’s shocking that this rejection of treaties was not the end of 
Roosevelt’s aggressive efforts in foreign affairs. Alas, the self-
proclaimed “Bull Moose” never stayed still long enough to be held 
accountable (image H). By staying in constant motion he kept 
Congress where he wanted them- always trying to catch up. 
Roosevelt took on Russo-Japanese Arbitration, no longer willing to 
bow to Congress as he had in 1902. His efforts in Russo-Japanese 
Arbitration culminated in the Portsmouth Treaty, ending the 
conflict and making him the first American recipient of the Nobel 
Peace Prize. The Prize eclipsed 1905’s arbitration failures and 
raised Roosevelt from celebrity to demi-god.  
His ‘bully pulpit’ never stood stronger and he wielded it well. 
In a letter penned by Roosevelt and read aloud by Secretary Root 
to a crowd at Carnegie Hall, Roosevelt espoused a “self-respecting 
friendship of all republics of this continent” with the goal of 
“justice and peace throughout the Western Hemisphere.”41 
Published in the New York Times his message certainly reached the 
people. And though, “We try to avoid meddling in affairs that our 
not our concern,” Roosevelt curiously continued to defend 
American involvements in Mexico, Panama, Cuba, Santa 
Domingo, and the Philippines.42 The Nobel Peace Prize brought 
another arbitration opportunity.  
French and German disputes over Morocco in 1906 resulted 
in the two nations calling upon Roosevelt for arbitration. The 
settlement totally neglected the sovereignty of Morocco and any 
respect for the rights of its people that Roosevelt’s public 
statements claimed to respect. The arbitration not only violated the 
Progressive values publicly advocated by the President, but 
constituted further pursuit of an impossible task that “merely gave 
part of the prologue to a drama which was soon to bring modern 
civilization almost to the breaking point in the World War.”43  
                                                          
41 “Afternoon Session.”  
42 Ibid.  
43 Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, 509.  
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With another arbitration “victory” under his belt, Roosevelt 
set his sights on a Second Hague Conference. A major aspect of 
Roosevelt’s popularity among the American people came from a 
different concern emerging from American entanglement in 
European affairs. His Nobel Prize was European affirmation of a 
civilized, genteel, disinterested America. The American peoples’ 
great concern for European approval added to the grandeur of 
Roosevelt’s ventures: “‘American Prestige in Europe’… It was a 
topic too often discussed.”44 The people loved the respect 
Roosevelt received which he frequently conveyed to them in his 
propagandist speeches.  
In an address Secretary Root welcomed the people to whom 
he spoke “as spiritual kindred of those Americans of great heart 
and clear intelligence who in times past, striving for ordered liberty 
and the peace of justice in this land, have conferred inestimable 
benefits upon all mankind…”45 Roosevelt and his administration 
resorted to fallacies to coax the people into “abandoning the 
existing state of very comfortable isolation.”46 Roosevelt 
masterfully wove ideals of fortitude, intelligence, and masculinity 
into his public addresses. This tactic began simply with testaments 
to “great heart and clear intelligence” but evolved into labeling 
proponents of the later anti-war movement not only as “cowardly” 
but as “active agents of the devil.”47 
Two months before the Hague Conference the New York 
Times and the Los Angeles Times published articles demonstrating 
the nation’s unquestioning support of their President. As Roosevelt 
neared the end of his term the people demanded his future 
involvement in international politics. A system had been devised 
that no one could see being perpetuated without the aid of 
Roosevelt. Truly no one could. Even King Leopold of Belgium, 
                                                          
44 Hart, The Great White Fleet, viii.  
45 “Afternoon Session.” 
46 Kennedy, “The United States as New Kid on the Block,” 246. 
47 Unger, Fighting Bob La Follette, 241-242.  
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famous for his atrocious exploitation of the Congo, kept a signed 
photograph of Roosevelt framed on his desk.48  
The people were told that “it lay in the power of one man to 
form a League of Peace…” and that the “force of public opinion 
educated as it is now” was “irresistible” in favor of Roosevelt.49 
His administration told the people what to think, encouraged that 
they were righteous and masculine in those thoughts, and urged 
how best to manifest those philosophies. Roosevelt posed the 
problem of world peace, riled up the population, and presented 
them with the solution- himself. It worked.  
One man voiced the sentiment of many: it was “beyond a 
doubt that President Roosevelt is the choice of the people as his 
own successor.”50 However, for those respecting precedents 
regarding a third term, “senator for life” was the 
recommendation.51 Another recurring suggestion: “If the third term 
is denied him, the sole purpose should be to place him at the head 
of the Hague arbitration board, for who else can placate the hostile 
world?” 52 Even a year earlier in 1906 the Washington Post 
published “Roosevelt’s Next Task” stating “He will be, we have 
no doubt, the president of the world’s high court of arbitration…”53  
The Second Hague Conference was an utter failure. The 
conference agreed on little, adopting a few resolutions of no real 
consequence. In 1905 Professor John Bassett Moore, LLD, a 
Columbia University professor of diplomacy and international law, 
anticipated the conference’s failure:  
 
The resort to arbitration is voluntary…the scope and progress 
of arbitration will depend, not so much upon special devices, 
or upon general declarations or descriptive exceptions, as upon 
                                                          
48 “Europe is Warned.” The Washington Post (1877-1922), 29 Aug. 1905. 
49 “Afternoon Session.” 
50 “Straw Vote Elects Him.” The Los Angeles Times, 7 April 1907. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.  
53 “Roosevelt’s Next Task,” The Washington Post (1877-1922), 10 March 1906. 
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the dispositions of nations- dispositions which, although they 
are subject to the modifying influence of public opinion, 
springs primarily from the national feelings, the national 
interests, and the national ambitions.54 
 
Essentially, arbitration depended upon a nation’s 
temperament. This reasoning, coupled with the unpredictable state 
of Europe made arbitration a venture, in Roosevelt’s words, 
“insisting on the impossible.”55 The conference was also far from 
Roosevelt’s acclaimed Progressive values.  It was an international 
conglomerate of paternalism fueled by idealism, making it the 
greatest bureaucracy on the face of the earth and as far from 
progressive ideals as possible. Secretary of Commerce and Labor 
Oscar Strauss reveled in describing Roosevelt as “the first among 
presidents, kings, and emperors” (image I).56 Such a claim satisfied 
the American people’s hunger for European approval yet could not 
have been less American, nor less Progressive.  
Just months after Moore’s article was published in Harper’s 
Magazine, The New York Times addressed the status of Europe 
following the end of the Russo- Japanese War (which had earned 
Roosevelt the Nobel Peace Prize). The article “From the Seed of 
the Hague” noted:  
 
…all the European Governments of importance have some 
embarrassing relations to the combatant nations or to the issues 
involved in the war. France and Britain are allies of Russia and 
Japan respectively. Germany is an object of certain suspicion 
as to its ultimate aims with regard to both these nations and to 
Russia as well. Austria-Hungary is entangled with the 
possibilities of the Near East as regards Germany and Russia. 
The other powers are, perhaps, conscious of their modest rank 
                                                          
54John Bassett Moore, “International Arbitration.” Harper’s Magazine, March 1905.  
55 “Afternoon Session.” 
56 Ibid.  
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and influence, and not anxious to meddle with what may make 
a disturbance among their more powerful neighbors.57 
 
Is such a state of affairs worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize? Clearly 
arbitration would not be a viable option, yet Roosevelt pushed for 
the Second Hague Conference. Despite the United States having 
their own issues rooted in the Gilded Age, Roosevelt looked to the 
issues of Europe rooted in centuries of imperialism, which 
Roosevelt hoped to join. It was an adventure for the “folk hero” 
and the people loved it.58 
Roosevelt’s next wildly expensive and decidedly 
unprogressive adventure would be the grandest yet. Just two 
months after the end of the Second Hague Conference, the “Grand 
Fleet” cast off the Atlantic Coast for a global tour. Lasting from 
the end of 1907 to 1909, the fleet cost roughly $96,606,000, 
according to the U.S. Naval Institute. The motive for the trip was 
pure vanity. The United States had suffered economic downturn 
yet still funded the “Grand Fleet” at the expense of the people and 
potential progressive reforms, including civil rights for women and 
African Americans, workers’ rights and safety, and health crises. 
Roosevelt’s passion for battleships and foreign respect was 
unyielding. With the fleet at sea, the people “watched the horizon 
for signs of foreign admiration” and were fed sanitized stories of 
fantasy: “in 1908, the public was told a success story matched only 
by the novels of Horatio Alger.” 59 As was his custom, Roosevelt 
reported exaggerations and propaganda to please the people and 
maintain his course.  
Roosevelt’s presidency finally ended. One American 
believed that Roosevelt, as a patriot, could not decline the call of 
his people to remain in service, yet Roosevelt did decline.60 
Roosevelt had led the nation on a grand adventure of diplomacy 
                                                          
57 “From the Seed of the Hague,” The New York Times, 13 June 1905.  
58 Dalton, “Why America Loved Teddy Roosevelt,” 269.  
59 Hart, The Great White Fleet, 9; ix.  
60 “Straw Vote Elects Him.”  
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only to step away from the helm at a vital junction. “Pride was not 
absent in Senator Henry Cabot Lodge’s statement to Roosevelt: 
‘We are putting terrible pressure on Europe, and this pressure may 
produce war at any time.’”61 This last action heightened 
international militarism and armament. Through years of 
arbitration Roosevelt had established himself as a keystone of the 
international community only to disappear on an African hunting 
trip after a last splendid stir of the pot.  
It’s ironic that Roosevelt would set so many new executive 
precedents and ignore half-century-old treaties and traditions, yet 
upheld the oldest executive precedent that applied less to him as he 
was only elected once. However, he had pledged to do so out of 
respect for democracy and the nation. Roosevelt, a proud student 
of history, should have been quite aware that his larger-than-life 
personality could not be successfully followed by the likes of Taft. 
Roosevelt, not the President of the United States, had become the 
settler of international affairs (image J). Once he was gone, 
arbitration and its hope for peace were too. Arbitration had been 
hastily extended beyond its natural scope, then abandoned. 
Roosevelt had often acted alone, making multiple facets of 
government uniquely dependent upon him.  
The unpredictable nature of arbitration might have prevailed 
had Roosevelt stayed involved. Perhaps Roosevelt’s dynamic 
personality and popular support could have supported the League 
of Nations, although in view of Congressional track record on 
arbitration treaties, neither the world nor the American people were 
ready. Neither Taft nor Wilson had the ability or gall to stand 
against Congress, or foreign powers, or to so empathically reach 
the people.  
Upon leaving office Roosevelt stated, “Well, I’m through 
now. I’ve done my work. People are going to discuss economic 
questions more and more: the tariff, currency, banks. They are hard 
questions, and I am not deeply interested in them; my problems are 
                                                          
61 Hart, The Great White Fleet, 8.  
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moral problems, and my teaching has been plain morality.”62 
Roosevelt played the people, big business, and the world to teach 
his morality. It was his world. He boasted, “No other president 
every enjoyed the presidency as I did.” However, this enjoyment 
was at the detriment to international stability, American 
democracy, and the American people.  
Many of the Progressive Movement’s greatest achievements 
came when Roosevelt was out of office and the Senate was able to 
turn its attention back to legislating, not chasing an imperial 
president. Some of Progressivism’s greatest failures came in the 
midst of his presidency. Roosevelt’s second term ignored the 
Niagara Conference, the Brownsville affair, the Atlanta race riots, 
the organization of labor unions, railroad reform, and economic 
depression amidst financing of the Grand Fleet. While Roosevelt 
arbitrated the Russo-Japanese War and earned the Peace Prize, 
W.E.B. Du Bois fought for the basic rights of African Americans 
in the Niagara Conference to no avail. The year of the Algeciras 
Conference saw the Brownsville Affair and Atlanta Race Riots, 
which Roosevelt omitted from his autobiography.63 Roosevelt’s 
attention to these issues could have brought progress. Roosevelt 
was unyielding. The issues to which he gave his attention, like 
environmentalism and trust busting, saw progress. Had his energy 
gone to issues between the coasts rather than beyond, the 
Progressive Movement would have been more successful by 
dealing with domestic issues that still plague the United States.  
In the end Roosevelt splintered Republican Party and the 
Progressive Movement ideologically between “internationalism, 
isolationism, and self-interested nationalism.”64 Roosevelt’s 
agenda allowed that, “progressivism could be embraced both by 
men whose root concern was the assertion of national power, such 
as Roosevelt and Beveridge… and men who were concerned with 
                                                          
62 Leuchtenburg, The American President, 29. 
63 Morris, Theodore Roosevelt, 12.  
64 John Milton Cooper, “Progressivism and American Foreign Policy: A 
Reconsideration” (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970) 276.  
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the preservation of democratic values,” like La Follette, Cullom, 
Twain, and Revered Ames.65 
 Without Roosevelt at the helm the nation went back to 
isolationist tendencies. Neither the people nor Roosevelt’s 
successors sought international engagements.66 The ordeal had 
been a personal crusade permitted by his popularity. Senator La 
Follette represents a true American Progressive, fighting his entire 
life, and even dying a Senator in the capital, for a more perfect 
union. Before the First World War, Senator La Follette highlighted 
the neglect of domestic affairs that began accumulating under 
Roosevelt: “Are the people of this country being so well 
represented in this war movement that we need to go abroad to 
give other people control of their governments?”67 After the war 
La Follette refused to be seduced by the empty promises residing 
in the proposed League of Nations, and stuck to the domestic 
agenda he had been pushing. With the League up for debate in 
Congress he saw the reality of the situation: “By ratifying this 
document… we shall involve this country in the quarrels and 
dissension of Europe for generations to come… [preventing the 
U.S. from] turning its energies to the solution of its domestic 
problems without reference to the bewildering imperialism and 
diplomacy.”68 Such involvement would burden the lower classes 
that would struggle to fund and be forced to fight in the army- not 
to mention African American veterans, who had fought for their 
country and their rights, only to return home to oppression. The 
country needed domestic peace and prosperity, livable conditions 
for all its citizens, and for government to truly represent its people.  
Secretary Root defended Roosevelt’s foreign affairs just 
months before the Second Hague Conference: 
 
                                                          
65 Ibid.  
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It is natural that the altruistic and humanitarian view, broader 
and less immediately practical, shall be taken by students, and 
thinkers, by teachers and philosophers,- by men who, not 
burdened by the necessity of putting theories into practice, are 
at liberty to look upon the world as it ought to be and to urge 
mankind on toward acceptance of their ideals.69   
 
Ridiculing the failures of the past is an easy task, yet this is a 
feeble excuse for imperialism fueled by vanity, racism, and big 
business at the expense of democracy. It is particularly tragic that 
senators, ministers, and newspapers were aware of executive 
missteps and fighting for progress. The study of the undermining 
of Progressive politics is vital to the state of the nation, its 
democracy, and the world – all of which suffer repercussions from 
this era and beyond as nations learn nothing from the vanity, 
nationalism, and extortion of the past. Privatization of democracy 
and perpetuation of the unholy matrimony of big business and 
politics continue to oppress Americans. The Constitution, its 
values, and the people protected under it must be government’s 
sole motivation. The Oval Office is no place for enacting 
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